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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
EVIDENCE-MOTOR VEHICLES-JUDICIAL NOTICE OF RADAR.-
Defendant was convicted of speeding on the evidence of two police
officers and a radar graph. Since no expert had testified as to the
operating principles of radar, defendant objected to the introduction
of the radar graph into evidence. The Court of Appeals held the
testimony of the two police officers sufficient to convict, and also stated
that judicial notice would be taken of the accuracy of radar. People
v. Magri, 3 N.Y.2d 562, 147 N.E.2d 728 (1958).
Judicial notice is that substitute for evidence whereby the court,
without proof, takes cognizance of law and facts.' Application of
scientific principles or discoveries, however, are not judicially recog-
nized as valid while still in the experimental stage.2 The accuracy of
their practical application must be generally recognized in their par-
ticular scientific field and be publicly accepted before they merit judi-
cial notice.3 The courts have exercised judicial notice in diverse
scientific areas. 4 The legislature also, by statute, may make the in-
troduction of scientifically proved facts prima facie evidence of guilt.'
Although courts have often discussed judicial notice of radar,
they have refused to admit radar readings into evidence unless an
expert witness first testified as to its operating principles and accu-
racy.6 Thus, in the first reported case concerning radar, a Delaware
1 UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 60 (5th ed. 1956).
2The courts have refused to exercise judicial notice in the fields of lie
detectors, People v. Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E.2d 31 (1938); People v.
Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W.2d 503 (1942), and truth serum, Knight v.
State, 97 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1957), because there is no general scientific rec-
ognition that such instruments are a valid and feasible method of detection.
3 See, e.g., RIcHARDSON, EVIDENCE § 40 (8th ed. 1955); UNIFORM RuLES
oF EVIDENcE, Rule 9.
4 See, e.g., People v. Soper, 243 N.Y. 320, 152 N.E. 433 (1926) (ballistics);
People v. Roach, 215 N.Y. 592, 109 N.E. 618 (1915) (fingerprints) ; Cowley
v. People, 83 N.Y. 464 (1881) (photographs); People v. Spears, 201 Misc.
666, 114 N.Y.S.2d 869 (New Rochelle City Ct. 1952) (drunkometer) ; Call v.
City of Burley, 57 Idaho 58, 62 P.2d 101 (1936) (X-ray); State v. Slater,
242 Iowa 958, 48 N.W.2d 877 (1951) (urine test to prove intoxication);
Jordan v. Mace, 144 Me. 351, 69 A.2d 670 (1949) (blood test to disprove
paternity).
5 See, e.g., N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIc LAW § 70(5) (c) (more than fifteen
hundredths of one per centum of alcohol in the blood is prima facie evidence
of intoxication) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 46-215.2 (Supp. 1956) (radar reading prima
facie evidence of speeding).
6 City of Rochester v. Torpey, 204 Misc. 1023, 128 N.Y.S.2d 864 (County
Ct. 1953); People v. Nasella, 3 M.2d 418, 155 N.Y.S.2d 463 (N.Y.C. Magis.
Ct. 1956); People v. Sachs, 1 M.2d 148, 147 N.Y.S.2d 801 (N.Y.C. Magis.
Ct. 1955); State v. Moffitt, 48 Del. 210, 100 A.2d 778 (Super. Ct. 1953);
Dietze v. State, 162 Neb. 80, 75 N.W.2d 95 (1956). In the Dietze case, the
court proposed this problem: Was the testimony that the radar operated by
throwing an electronic beam across the highway, which beam when broken,
would indicate the speed of the object breaking the beam, sufficient foundation
for the introduction of the radar evidence? The court concluded that this was
not sufficient ground work, but since the defendant did not object at the trial,
he was precluded from doing so on appeal.
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court in 1953 7 allowed its introduction after an expert testified and
then charged the jury as follows:
Based upon the testimony of the expert, . . . the evidence as to the accuracy
of the Speed Meter was admissible . . . subject . . . to your determination as
to its accuracy in measuring the speed of the defendant's vehicle. . . .8
The jury was further charged that radar alone as evidence of speeding
. .. would furnish sufficient evidence for the conviction of the de-
fendant. . . ." 9 Two years later the highest court of New Jersey, in
a similar dictum statement, dispensed with the necessity of expert
testimony.' 0
New York has followed this trend. At first the courts refused
to admit radar readings into evidence unaccompanied by expert
testimony. 1 Later cases indicated that the accuracy of radar was
sufficiently established to warrant use of judicial notice.' 2  In the
present case, the Court of Appeals has completed the trend toward
judicial notice of radar.13 However, the conviction was not sustained
upon the radar evidence since a foundation for its admission was not
sufficiently proved in the record.' 4 It should be further noted that
when judicial notice is taken of the accuracy of radar, radar devices
in general cannot be attacked as being inaccurate. However, the par-
ticular device in question is still subject to attack by alleging that no
sufficient foundation was established for its admission into evidence.
The Court of Appeals did not specify what foundation must first
be laid. It would appear, however, that the foundation is of the same
type needed to introduce evidence of a speedometer reading.' 5  The
7 State v. Moffitt, 48 Del. 210, 100 A.2d 778 (Super. Ct. 1953).8 Id. at 779.
9 Id. at 779-80.
10 State v. Dantonio, 18 N.J. 570 115 A.2d 35 (1955).
"1 City of Buffalo v. Beck, 205' Misc. 757, 130 N.Y.S.2d 354 (Sup. Ct.
1954); People v. Offermann, 204 Misc. 769, 125 N.Y.S.2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
In the Beck case, four police officers testified from visual observations that
defendant exceeded the speed limit, but the court reversed the conviction since
it could not be determined if the conviction rested upon the testimony of the
officers or the radar. This case is criticized in Baer, Radar Goes to Court,
33 N.C.L. Rxv. 355, 377-78 (1955).
12 People v. Nasella, 3 M2d 418, 155 N.Y.S.2d 463 (N.Y.C. Magis. Ct.
1956) (dictum); People v. Sachs, 1 M.2d 148, 147 N.Y.S.2d 801 (N.Y.C. Magis.
Ct. 1955) (dictum); People v. Sarver, 205 Misc. 523, 129 N.Y.S.2d 9 (New
Rochelle City Ct. 1954) (dictum) ; People v. Katz, 205 Misc. 522, 129 N.Y.S.2d
8 (Yonkers City Ct. 1954) (dictum).13 People v. Magri, 3 N.Y.2d 562, 147 N.E.2d 728 (1958).
14 Id. at 566, 147 N.E.2d at 731. See also City of Rochester v. Torpey, 204
Misc. 1023, 128 N.Y.S.2d 864 (County Ct. 1953) ; cf. People v. Heyser, 2 N.Y.2d
390, 141 N.E.2d 553 (1957).25 To prove the accuracy of a speedometer the witness must testify: that
he saw the speedometer being tested; and describe the way it was tested (e.g.,
the speedometer cable was detached and attached to a speedometer machine,
with a master speedometer, which tests the accuracy of the speedometer).
People v. Sachs, 1 M.2d 148, 155-56, 147 N.Y.S.2d 801, 808-09 (N.Y.C. Magis.
1958]
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foundation should establish: that the radar officer was trained; 16 that
the radar was tested by a trial run before it was used; 17 that the
speedometer of the car in the trial run was tested; 18 and that the
radar graph showed the results of the trial run. 19 After the radar
preliminaries have been established, the People must then prove the
defendant was the speeder. The proof of this must show: that the
radar officer observed the speeding car and wrote on the radar graph
a description of the car; 20 and that after apprehension, but before
issuance of a summons, the apprehending officer verified that it was
the proper person."
A proposed addition to the Vehicle and Traffic Law [Section
56-c],22 now pending state legislative action, would require an even
broader foundation for the admission of radar readings into evidence.
In addition to proof of the operator's qualifications and proper testing
of the device, the proposed section would require the People to prove
that signs indicating the speed limit and the use of radar were posted
on the road where the violation occurred, and that a complete inspec-
tion was made ".... six months prior to its use, of its [radar device's]
mechanical parts and assembly by a mechanic trained in the construc-
tion and operation of such device." 23
Judicial notice of radar should facilitate enforcement of speeding
regulations and help reduce the number of road fatalities. However,
the legislature has delayed full use of radar on state highways by
Ct. 1955). Judicial notice of speedometers was taken in People v. Tyler, 109
N.Y.S.2d 756 (N.Y.C. Ct. Spec. Sess., App. Part 1952).
16 To be a radar officer in New York City a police officer must complete a
training class, given by the Engineering Bureau, that lasts over four months.
After completing this class, two months of road training follows. People v.
Sachs, supra note 15, at 149-50, 147 N.Y.S2d at 803. Compare this with the
training given in Washington. In reply to the question of the amount of train-
ing he received a police officer testified, ". . . a simple operation of testing
and warming up the speed meter, locating the box in the trunk. That is the
sum total of my training." State v. Ryan, 48 Wash. 2d 304, 293 P.2d 399, 403
(1956) (dissenting opinion).
17 In order to show the radar was working properly a patrol car passes
through the radar beam twice, once at the speed limit and once at ten to fifteen
miles per hour greater than the limit. If the difference between the speedometer
and the radar reading is more than two miles per hour, the radar is not work-
ing properly. Kopper, The Scientific Reliability of Radar Speedometers, 33
N.C.L. REv. 343, 353 (1955).
is People v. Sachs, 1 M.2d 148, 157, 147 N.Y.S.2d 801, 809 (N.Y.C. Magis.
Ct. 1955).
19 Ibid.
20 On the graph should appear: the time and place of the speeding; the
weather conditions; the color and make of the car; and a part of the license
plate number. Kopper, supra note 17, at 353-54.
21 People v. Sachs, note 18 supra.
22 S. Int. No. 2612, A. Int. No. 3045.
23 139 N.Y.L.J. p. 4, col. 1 (March 5, 1958).
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choosing, even in the light of the Governor's request for a change,24
to retain the requirement that the apprehending police officer follow
the speeder for a quarter mile in order to convict.25
X
EVIDENCE-RECORD OF POLICE SPEEDOMETER TEST HELD AD-
MISSIBLE UNDER CIVIL PRACTICE ACT SECTION 374-a.-Based on
patrolman-relator's speedometer reading while following the defen-
dant's automobile, defendant was charged with speeding.1 The de-
fense claimed a deprivation of the rights to confrontation 2 and cross-
examination 3 due to the failure of the People to produce a witness
who either tested or witnessed the testing of the radio patrol car's
speedometer. The Court held that the Police Department's official
records concerning the accuracy of the speedometer 4 were admissible
into evidence under Section 374-a of the Civil Practice Act. 5 People
ex rel. Katz v. Jones (N.Y.C. Magis. Ct., N. Queens Dist. Feb. 26,
1958) (opinion of Magis. Scopas).
Confrontation implies the right to the opportunity to cross-
examine.6 However, unlike cross-examination, this constitutional
24 Governor's Message, McKINNEZ's SasioN LAWs OF NEW YORK, No. 1,
A-73 (3) (1958).
25 See N.Y. VEHicLE & TRAFFic LAW § 56(3), as interpreted by the instant
case and the Governor's Message, note 24 supra.
1 N.Y.C. TRAFFIC REGULATIONS § 60.
2 N.Y. CONsr. art. 1, § 6. ". . [I]n any trial in any court whatever the
party accused shall . . . be confronted with the witnesses against him." Ibid.
3 "Cross-examination . . . is a matter of right in every trial of disputed
issue of fact." Friedel v. Board of Regents, 296 N.Y. 347, 352, 73 N.E.2d
545, 547 (1947).
4The Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Police Commissioner
(c. 24, § 25.1) read, "If the speedometer is found to be accurate the date and
signature of the member of the force witnessing the test will be written im-
mediately . . . on [a card] . . . [which] will be filed in the command to which
the vehicle is assigned." People ex rel. Katz v. Jones, pp. 3-4 (N.Y.C. Magis.
Ct, N. Queens Dist. Feb. 26, 1958) (opinion of Magis. Scopas). Furthermore,
"by virtue of the Administrative Code of the City of New York, section
982-8.0, the court ... is required to take judicial notice of all rules and regu-
lations of New York City administrative.. . agencies." RICHARDSON, EvIDENCE
§25 (8th ed. 1955).
5 "Any writing or record . . . made as a memorandum or record of any
act, transaction, occurrence or event, shall be admissible in evidence in proof
of said act, transaction, occurrence or event, if the trial judge shall find that
it was made in the regular course of any business, and that it was the regular
course of such business to make such memorandum or record at the time of
such act, transaction, occurrence or event, or within a reasonable time there-
after." N.Y. Civ. Pmc. AcT § 374-a.
6 See People v. Nisonoff, 293 N.Y. 597, 601, 59 N.E.2d 420, 422 (1944).
See also 5 WIGMORE, EviDENcE § 1365 (3d ed. 1940). Confrontation also con-
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